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This paper discusses state of the art of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), drones (unmanned aerial vehicle -UAV's) 
and control infrastructure. The focus has been to explore risks, vulnerabilities and safe use of UAS in industrial 
operations. The use of UAS has been in rapid expansion in governmental areas (monitoring, military applications) 
and in the public domain (leisure, photography, transportation, monitoring). Several vulnerabilities have been 
identified. Few empirical analyses of operations, incidents and successful recoveries are available due to limited 
reporting. However, safety information from military drone operations are available. The three research questions 
in this paper are to describe planned use of UAS, major risks and benefits of UAS, and needed research, requirements 
and rules to improve safety and resilience of operations. We have explored the status of research in Norway, we 
have performed a literature review of autonomy in aviation, and we have explored relevant cases of industrial 
transport systems. Our findings indicate that rules and regulations are lagging development of technology and that 
there is poor focus on major risks related to human factors in engineering, design and operations. To ensure that 
safety and resilience is in focus from design, there is a need to define scope (i.e. control system as part of UAS) 
establish functional guidelines (such as human factors guidelines) and improve regulatory frameworks. 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we are exploring safety of unmanned 
aviation systems (UAS) based on drones 
(unmanned aerial vehicle -UAV's). Safety of UAS 
is influenced by the practices of aviation, such as 
rules, regulation, organisation, technology and 
human factors. Learning from existing practice is 
needed since aviation has ultra-high safety, 
Amalberti (2017), with an accident rate of 1.08 
accidents per 1 million flights. The International 
Air Transport Association (IATA) represents 290 
airlines in 120 countries and carries 82% of the 
world’s air traffic. IATA achieves “ultra-safety” 
in their aviation operations, having no hull-losses 
in 2012 or 2017 with jet or turboprop equipment.  
The practices from general aviation should be 
helpful when establishing safety of UAS.  
By autonomy we mean a system that can make 
a choice free from outside influences and change 
its initial way of programmed actions (having 
some notion of "free will", where actions are not 
determined completely by previously existing 
causes, i.e. non-deterministic Hoefer, 2003). By 
automated we mean a system that will do exactly 
what it is programmed to do. This is based on the 
taxonomy and discussion of autonomy from 
Vagia et al. (2016). In Parasuman and Riley 
(1997) automation and autonomy is described as 
“The execution by a machine agent (usually a 
computer) of a function that was previously 
carried out by a human”. 
Manned flight operations have been highly 
automated, but full autonomous operations have 
not been established yet. One issue that challenges 
autonomy is handling of the unexpected vs the 
human ability to act and recover. One successful 
recovery that has been used to discuss the 
challenges of autonomy has been the incident of 
US Airways Flight 1549 from New York City's 
LaGuardia Airport on January 15, 2009, that lost 
all engine power by hitting a flock of Canada 
geese. Unable to reach any airport, the pilots 
glided the plane to a ditching in the Hudson River, 
and all 155 people aboard were rescued, NTSB 
(2010). An incident that could have been difficult 
to handle by autonomy at present. Discussing 
automation, we have adopted level of automation 
(LoA) from SAE (2016); describing LoA through 
responsibilities between pilot and aircraft: 
Table 1. Levels of Automation – responsibilities 
LoA  Human 
Pilot 
Aircraft 
control 
1:No 
automation 
All operations Warns 
Protect 
2:Limited 
assist; 
 Auto throttle 
Drives 
In-the-loop 
Guides 
Assist 
3:Assist, 
Tactical; 
Supervised 
On-the loop 
Pilot monitors 
all time 
Manage 
movement within 
defined limits 
4:Automated 
Assist 
Strategic 
Out-of-loop 
Asked by 
system 
Flies, but may 
give back control 
5: 
Autonomous 
Completely 
out-of-loop 
Flies with 
graceful 
degradation 
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The actual control (responsibilities) can be 
performed remotely or locally (by a human or 
through machine control).  
An UAS is an aircraft that may be controlled 
remotely (through LoA:1 to Loa:4) as a Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft System – RPAS or flying fully 
autonomously (as defined by LoA:5).  
Safety is related to accidental harm, while 
security is related to intentional harm. Safety is 
defined as: “the degree to which accidental harm 
is prevented, reduced and properly reacted to”, 
Firesmith (2003). Security: “the degree to which 
malicious harm is prevented, reduced and 
properly reacted to”. 
Drones have often been used in tasks being 
dangerous, dirty or dull. Thus, safety and security 
have often been the principal drivers when using 
UAS. Use of UAS is expanding, a compound 
annual growth rate of 100% has been estimated in 
Europe and in the US from 2016 (Quilter et al., 
2017). By the end of 2017 there were approx. 1,1 
million UAS in the US.  
There is a need to ensure high reliability, safety 
and security when UAS is being used in critical 
operations such as transport of medical supplies 
(blood, medicine). As the use expands, there is a 
need to limit the vulnerability of UAS. 
1.1 Scope – equipment and airspace 
The UAS consist of the drone (with a network of 
sensors – navigation system, different electronic 
systems, actuators, power system, mainframe, 
payload) and communication links to the 
environment (such as a simple controller or 
ground control systems). 
The airspace is divided into regulated/ 
controlled airspace and unregulated airspace. 
Individuals can operate UAS in unregulated 
airspace, however sharing controlled airspace 
between manned aircrafts and UAS is at present a 
challenge. In the US, regulation is developed 
through the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), while in EU through European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA). The regulators - FAA and 
EASA is challenged by the rapid technological 
development of UAS, and lags somewhat in the 
development of regulation, Altawy et al. (2017). 
There is a need to define the operational tasks 
to explore the risks of UAS. Key tasks being 
performed in preparation and operations of UAS 
are: -Flight Planning; Start & Taxi; Take-off & 
Departure; en-route; Aerial Work; Descent & 
Approach; Landing; Halt/ Post landing; and 
Handover activities. Aerial work can encompass 
delivery of supplies such as dropping goods by 
parachutes. During these tasks, communication is 
needed and is on-going between the pilot and the 
UAS. There may be a need to communicate to Air 
traffic Control; to other aircrafts; to other actors 
such as Police (in case of accidents). 
1.2 Challenges and research questions 
Development and implementation of UAS is 
dependent on many factors, such as benefits given 
by the technology but also challenges of safety 
and security. Significant benefits are achieved 
using UAS, such as saving lives by delivering 
blood or medical supplies faster (as reported in 
Time, 2018); by reducing risks or replacing 
dangerous and error prone helicopter operations. A 
key factor of this replacement is safety and 
security of UAS operations. Our perspective of 
safety and security is based on an integrated view 
of organisational issues, technology and human 
factors. As discussed in Lund and Aarø (2004), 
risk reduction must be based on a broad set of 
actions such as organisational issues (regulation, 
procedures) technical design, and human factors 
issues such as usability, training and awareness. 
The UAS is vulnerable to attacks through the 
systems it consists of, such as sensors, actuators, 
communication links and ground control systems. 
As an example, an Iranian cyber warfare unit was 
able to land a US drone based on a spoofing attack 
modifying global positioning system-GPS data 
(Altawy et al. 2017). 
In Petritoli et al. (2017) the Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) was estimated for 
drones, being around 1000 hours. Approximately 
100 times higher than MTBF in manned flights. 
Based on 1000 - failures, the division of failures 
were in: Power plant (411); Ground Control 
system (273); Navigation system (146); 
Electronic system (67); Mainframe (54) and 
Payload (53). However, the risk of these failures 
is dependent on the consequences of the failures 
such as weight (lightweight drone observation, or 
heavy industrial transport) and the area of use (in 
a urban area/ city or in remote and sparsely 
populated areas). Failure of power system can 
have significant impact in an industrial (heavy) 
drone flying in a city and crashing by high speed 
(i.e. high energy impact). 
Experiences of UAS from the US government, 
Waraich et al. (2013), documents that mishaps may 
happen (i.e. 50-100 mishaps occur every 100,000 
flight hours’ vs human-operated aircraft where 
there is one mishap per 100,000 flight hours). The 
mishap rate of UAS is significantly higher than 
manned operations. Main causes are related to poor 
attention to human factors science, such as poor 
design of ground control centres, Waraich et al. 
(2013), Hobbes et al. (2014). 
Thus, we see the need to explore the context 
and actual use of the UAS to discuss risks and 
mitigating actions such as regulation.  
The three research questions in this paper are: 
• What is the status of planned use and research 
of UAS in transport systems? 
• What are the major risks and benefits of 
unmanned aircraft transport systems?   
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• What are needed mitigation in research, 
requirements and rules to improve safety and 
resilience of UAS operations? 
2. Methods  
To describe the planned use of UAS we have 
performed a review of research and innovation 
from the research database of the Norwegian 
research council in the period 2008 to 2021 and 
reviewed drone research. The search string used 
were UAS, UA* or Drones. We excluded project 
with grants below USD 12000 (NOK 100 000). 
The projects are listed by their short descriptive 
name found in the database.  
We have performed a literature review in Web 
of Science and Scopus based on the search string 
"Safety and Security of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems/ or Drones /or UAS". We limited the 
search to the period 2013 to 2019 to get current 
studies, and excluded papers not written in 
English.  
As a part of an aviation study focusing on 
safety and autonomy in Norway, (Evjemo, 2018), 
seven interviews (of regulators, fixed wing and 
drone pilots, flight controllers) were performed to 
discuss safety of increased level of automation in 
manned flights and use of UAS.  
3. Results and discussion 
In the following we have described the use of 
UAS; the planned use of UAS based on research, 
then the result of a literature review of safety and 
security; and lastly key result from interviews. 
UASs are used in many different areas, we have 
listed some cases:  
1) Providing Internet access in rural areas or in 
areas when there is a special need (He et al, 
2017) 
2) Cinematography and aerial photography – 
(Rao et al, 2016) 
3) Inspection of equipment to improve quality 
or avoid dangerous work (Rao et al, 2016). 
Cases financed by Norwegian research 
council: Inspection of power lines by 
artificial intelligence (AI); inspection of 
storage tanks/ facilities to avoid dangerous 
conditions, see section 3.1 
4) Ambulance and medical services, delivering 
medicine, aid, medical equipment fast and 
safe to remote areas or in a crisis; as an 
example, DHL is regularly delivering 
medicine twice a day to the island of Luist 
(Altawy et al, 2016) and blood supply is 
delivered by drones in Rwanda from 2016 
within 30 minutes (Time, 2018). 
5) Deploying UAS carrying specialized medical 
equipment in response to medical 
emergencies (Balasingam, 2017). 
6) Disaster help – to get overview of damages, 
placement of people or infrastructure, deliver 
critical equipment or supplies fast; UAS were 
used in the Fukushima Nuclear disaster to 
deliver food supplies and in assessments of 
radiation levels within the reactor buildings. 
Chowdhury et al (2017) Balasingam, (2017). 
7) Farming/ crop management (Rao et al, 2016). 
8) Illicit transportation: Drug smuggling or 
delivering goods/ drugs to prison inmates, 
Altawy et al. 2016) 
9) Drones used as physical weapons (both 
through military use and others) or as cyber 
weapons to spread malware (Valente, 2017) 
10) Monitoring and survey of areas (i.e. 
monitoring of seaways), border control  
(Pathiyil,  et al. 2017) 
Barriers for rapid deployment of this 
technology has often been the lack of timely and 
risk-based legislation, (Pathiyil, et al. 2017). 
However, EASA have drafted legislation for UAS 
to fly safely in the EU (EASA 2018) – providing 
basic guidelines for safety, security and privacy. 
Including extent of how other traffic or people on 
the ground can be endangered, drone certification, 
insurance, protection of environment (in relation 
to noise and pollution) and security and privacy 
concerns.  
3.1 Planned use of UAS based on research  
In the following section we have documented 
research and innovation projects financed by the 
research council in Norway. We found 31 projects 
that were financed. The financing in the period 
from 2008 to 2021 has increased significantly, as 
shown in the following Table 1. 
Table 1. Investments in UAS research increasing 
Period - Year Financing 
2008-2012 35,9 Mill NOK 
2013-2017 56,7 Mill NOK 
2018-2021 119,3 Mill NOK 
Thus, there is an increased focus on research 
related to UAS. Exploring different application 
areas, we list the found projects by their short 
name from the database (*denotes safety focus), 
allocated to the following areas: 
• Marine (7): *Safe lifting between supply 
ships and oil platforms using drones; *Safe 
maritime landing for UAS; Un-manned 
operation of Fish Farming; *ASSUR- 
airborne ship safety UAS to look for man-
overboard or oil spills; *Ice monitoring and 
technological improvements in 
communication; UAS in North for Ice 
monitoring; *In ship - autonomous inspection 
of storage tanks.  
4      S.O. Johnsen and T.E. Evjemo 
• Technological improvement (7): Improved 
batteries for drones; Development of 
composite electrical motor for Drones; 
Development of hybrid propulsion of UAS; 
Vertical take-off and landing; Scout for 
inspection of equipment; Mosquito – 
technology for small scale UAS; *DroneSafe 
– developing world class drones for 
recording in constrained areas. 
• Power line inspection (5): Maintenance; 
*Fault detection (by use of AI); 
*Autonomous inspection; *Smart Electricity 
Grid Inspection; Remote Inspection of 
Wooden Utility Poles. 
• Air control systems (3): Air traffic 
management of UAS; Autopilot design for 
UAS in extreme conditions; Low altitude 
UAS communication and tracking;  
• Biological/Farming (2): Survey of plant 
parasites; Counting of seal population;  
• City management (2): Observe building 
changes in a city based on Drone surveys; 
*Inspection of critical infrastructure – status 
of bridges built in concrete 
• Health Care (2): *UAS for fast and secure 
transportation of blood products and 
biological material; Development of 
commercial medical transport service;  
• Geographical survey (1): Measurement of 
gravity and magnetic fields. 
• Societal issues (1): responsible adoption of 
visual surveillance technologies in the news 
media. 
Of these cases we observe that 10 of 31 
projects (marked by *) used improved safety in 
operations as a key argument for the project, 
however there was poor focus on security.  
Living in Norway - a decentralized country 
with vast distances, it was surprising that the 
following were not funded: -disaster services; use 
of drones to speed up deliveries of critical 
supplies between remote areas; use of drones to 
establish efficient parcel deliveries. 
There has been little focus on safety-oriented 
research to improve MTBF such as reliability of 
the power system and necessary research and 
requirements in relation to ground control 
systems. When looking at safety challenges 
identified from use of drones (Petritoli et al. 
2017), the main challenges has been related to 
Power plant; Ground Control system; Navigation 
system; Electronic system; Mainframe and 
Payload. The human factors deficiencies of 
ground control systems as mentioned in Waraich 
et al. (2013) or Hobbes et al. (2014) has not been 
sufficiently mitigated.  
Implementation of new technology are 
dependent on development of societal and 
organisational aspects (Ethics, rules, regulation, 
communication, accident reporting systems, 
stakeholder development), user needs and quality 
of Human Factors design in operation of new 
technology. However – these areas have not been 
mentioned in the identified research projects. 
The Norwegian Government has published a 
strategy for the use of Drones/ UAS in Norway, 
ND (2018). Key strategies are: Establish rules and 
regulation; Focus on safety; Inform users about 
relevant rules and regulations; Prioritize use of 
drones in government; Support research and 
innovation related to the use of UAS. The strategy 
is somewhat sketchy related to ethical and social 
aspects; security of drones related to 
vulnerabilities/ mitigating actions; and 
documentation of known safety challenges.  
In summary, based on the project having 
acquired research financing there seems to be a 
need for more systematic research and focus on: 
• Ethical and social aspects of the use of 
UAS – as an example the importance of 
building networks/ societal actor networks 
to support safe and secure use of Drones 
(by co-opting network such as Norwegian 
UAS member association) 
• Human Factors based design, such as 
Human factors Guidelines for Ground 
Control centres - to support improved 
quality of operations 
• Security and safety of UAS, especially UAS 
to be used in an industrial setting. Need 
systematic gathering of operational data, 
more research and development to improve 
safety of industrial drone transportation, with 
focus on major risks and improvement of 
MTBF (based on registers of incidents).  
• Regulation to support deployment of 
industrial UAS in urban areas, and 
autonomous transport in rural areas 
• Regulation and research to integrate UAS 
in controlled airspace  
• Poor focus on development of methods to 
build resilience, i.e. to assess vulnerabilities, 
risks and how to mitigate the unexpected 
through resilience – (i.e. poor focus on 
resilience engineering of autonomous 
systems). 
3.2 Literature review – safety and security 
Security threats are dependent on context, 
capabilities/intent of adversary and use. Scope of 
security must address risk of physical harm but 
also address confidentiality, integrity of 
information and availability. The threat model 
must assess components of the UAS drone (i.e. a 
network of sensors; navigation system, electronic 
system, actuators, power system, mainframe, 
payload and communication links to the 
environment and the ground control systems). 
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The capabilities of the adversary can be graded 
from low, medium to high (Altawy et al. 2016). 
Low is the ability to disclose information (getting 
access to communication or data stored in 
unencrypted form). Medium is the ability to be 
authenticated by the UAS system and gaining 
access to on-board data. High is the ability to 
control or disrupt the regular operation. 
Security threats of consumer drones mentioned 
in Valente (2017) and Altawy et al. (2016). are: 
• Fly away attacks (stealing the drone) or Take-
down a flying drone - intentionally causing 
accidents (in sensitive areas as nuclear plants 
or in national symbols) –through jamming or 
spoofing the GPS data or the UAS 
transmissions. 
• Injecting falsified sensor data or performing 
Denial of Service attacks to destabilize the 
UAS making it to crash. 
• Malicious hardware or software, such as 
backdoors to take control of the system. (A 
backdoor was also present in Boeing 787, 
making it possible to take over the avionics 
and control the airplane). 
• Loss of communication - Lock-out owner of 
the drone from connecting; or manipulating 
the video streams used to navigate the UAS. 
• Steal user data (pictures, streaming video, 
communication link) and related privacy 
issues – taking unauthorized video or pictures 
• Privacy issues – as an example: drone 
supplier collects data from flight and stores 
data in servers in the US and in China 
These vulnerabilities are due to several issues, 
such as lack of authentication (of the operator and 
devices), poor/ no encryption of communication, 
poor password protection. These issues can be 
mitigated as described in Valente (2017) by 
securing drone access by strong passwords in user 
authentication; limiting devices allowed to 
connect (i.e. enforce authentication); disabling 
services with poor security (Telnet, FTP); 
encrypting communication, certify software 
dependent on risk levels and continuously 
upgrade software in use. A similar set of security 
requirements are suggested by Altawy et. al. 
(2016), i.e. only authorized access; specification 
of availability in operations; information 
confidentiality and integrity; system integrity i.e. 
ability to guarantee authenticity of software and 
hardware components and accountability of 
actions (i.e. register of issued actions/ 
commands). These requirements have identified 
the need for a broader eco-system approach in 
developing the infrastructure and service 
environment of drones, as described by Johnsen 
et al. (2017).  
Manned aviation has become highly automated 
and have reduced the crew from five-person 
crews in 1950s to two-person crews from 1990s. 
There is a discussion to reduce crews to single 
pilot (Driscoll et al. 2017). The main reasons 
humans are still on the flight deck is to manage 
risks and handle the unexpected or complex 
situations. Automation is reliable but computers 
give up at the first sign of trouble, needing human 
intervention whether the human is ready for it or 
not. This creates the need for more understanding 
and research in Resilience Engineering i.e. the 
ability to handle the unexpected and recover, 
(Johnsen et al. 2017). 
Some of the challenges of controlling UAS by 
air traffic controllers are the restricted see-and-
avoid capabilities (due to restricted view of 
airspace); delayed response to instructions since 
control is dependent on control signals from 
Ground Control; Differences in size and speed 
(leads to varying impact of turbulence); extra 
workload on the operators; (Altawy et al. 2016). 
These challenges can lead to drone collisions or 
by drone crashing into the terrain.  
Due to the possibilities of mishaps, the quality 
of safety and security in the UAS software should 
be certified by an appropriate agent. The range of 
environments and the differences in UAS 
operations creates different requirement and risks. 
A risk-based approach of certification is 
suggested in Graydon et al. (2009), based on the 
aircraft, the payload, the mission and the 
operating environment.  In Perez (2012) there is a 
description of robust autonomy that can be used as 
a framework for certification, to ensure that the 
autonomous system can continue its operations or 
safely shut down. In addition, the security 
requirements from Altawy et al. (2016) should be a 
part of this certification scheme. 
A more proactive mitigation of attacks by UAS 
can be established in sensitive areas through 
monitoring drones by electro-magnetic waves, 
cameras (heath sensitive cameras recording 
temperatures or using broader spectrums) or by 
sound. Then halting or stopping drones through 
attack drones or jamming as mentioned in Kaleem 
et al. (2018), Altawy et. al (2016). In addition, there 
are anti-drone rifles designed to disable drones 
within 1300 feet, Altawy et al (2016). 
Mobile phone applications have also been 
developed for prison staff, to be able to detect 
drones crossing into prison areas. More advanced 
examples of detection and identification of UAS 
has been done by Quilter et al (2017) using staring 
radar in Monaco, to identify drones within 5 km 
distances.  
Undesired UAS incidents in urban areas, 
Pathiyil (2017), are described as:  
• Injury to persons, by UAS – a special case 
could by collisions with manned aircrafts or 
disruption of air traffic 
• Damage to property or to UAS (Theft and 
vandalism) 
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• Loss of privacy (physical, emotional, data) 
• Sound pollution, disturbances by flying 
drones in the vicinity of people  
Sound pollution from UAS can be significant, 
in Kloet et al (2017) they found that propeller 
design and odd number of blades can significantly 
reduce noise (using experiences from low noise 
fans). There is a need for legislative restrictions 
and guidelines to ensure noise to be acceptable. 
Systematic documentation of drone incidents 
(safety and security issues) are needed in order to 
implement risk-based mitigation, support learning 
and be able to estimate and improve MTBF. 
The risk is dependent on type of operation 
(delivery, data collection, surveillance, 
photography, inspection, other…) and details of 
UAS (weight, speed, height of operation).  EASA 
(2016) has estimated probability of fatality of 
different UAS weights, and estimated probability 
of fatality as 1% with an UAS weight of 250g, but 
50% fatality with a weight of 600g. 
Pathiyil et al (2017) lists UAS safety guidelines 
from regulatory bodies around the word, 
describing distances from people, property and 
safe height limits. Regulation varies, related to 
densely populated areas: i.e. "do not fly overhead 
people and property & do not fly within 50 meters 
of persons and property" from EASA; or "Keep 
sufficient distance from people and property", 
from Singapore. Limits are often prescribed (i.e. 
30 metres, 50 metres or 75 metres) or based on 
assessment (i.e. enough distance, safe distance, 
minimize hazard). Maximum height, are from 200 
feet (60 meter) to 492 feet (150 meter). In Ireland 
UAS flights over populated area can be conducted 
only at 5000 feet (1500 meter) or higher.  
In Norway UAS are divided in three classes 
with increasing requirements (CAA, 2018): 
• RO1: Max weight 2.5 kg. (Operations within 
line of sight)  
• RO2: Max weight 25 kg. (operations under 
120 m (400 foot) - if out of sight – restrictions 
related to rules governing control systems). 
• RO3: Weight more than 25 kg may fly 120 m 
above ground; pilot must have LAPL (Light 
Aircraft Pilot Licence), PPL (Private Pilot 
License), CPL (Commercial Pilot License) or 
ATPL (Airline Transport Pilot Licence). 
Must communicate with Air Control. 
Risk assessment of integrating UAS into 
controlled airspace has been performed in Ferreira 
et al. (2018). New hazards are introduced such as 
probability of collisions, disruption of traffic, loss 
of communication. There is also a need to 
establish more rigorous methods to include UAS 
in urban areas and in shared spaces (i.e. controlled 
airspace). They found that the risk levels of UAS 
were acceptable related to defined target level of 
safety stipulated by ICAO - International Civil 
Aviation Organization. However, the workload of 
the aviation controllers must be assessed as UAS 
are introduced into the airspace. 
In Rao et.al (2016) there was a discussion of the 
societal impact of commercial drones – discussing 
issues such as damages to persons or property, 
privacy issues and ownership of data and personal 
and commercial liability. Mitigating actions were 
suggested to be a registry of drones and owners, 
and real-time systems for drone detection in critical 
areas. To ensure minimal harm, it was suggested 
that a drone should have the ability to go to a safe/ 
secure state by perform safe landing (example 
using a parachute) or travel to a safe site, this is also 
suggested by Gomes et al (2017). GPS jamming 
was mentioned, as an attack that may disrupt other 
vehicles or cause accidents/ collisions. Challenges 
and mitigation from Rao et.al (2016) are listed in 
Table 2:  
Table 2. Some challenges and mitigating actions 
Challenges Mitigation 
Privacy 
detection 
Registry of owners/ drones 
Systems for drone detection 
Accountability Assign liability to owners, 
Registry of owner/ drones 
Control/ 
Regulation 
Drone tracking; Ability to safe 
landing; Insurance; Definition of 
aerial bounds;Regulation in sync 
with technology development 
A key issue has been the slow regulatory process 
as technology is rapidly being developed. In 
Eurocontrol (2006) a specification is described for 
the use of military unmanned aerial vehicles as 
operational air traffic outside segregated airspace. 
This structure can be explored when establishing 
functional based rules and regulation.  
Management of risks, safety and security 
should be based on risk frameworks looking at 
scenarios where UAS is being used. The risks 
must be managed by taking steps to reduce the 
likelihood of major hazards (i.e. rules limiting the 
use of UAS) and reduce the severity (reduce effect 
of impact, keeping distances from objects that can 
be damaged). The risk governance framework 
from Renn (2005) should be used, consisting of 
problem framing, documentation of hazards and 
vulnerabilities, risk judgement, risk 
communication and risk management.   
3.3 Result from interviews 
Key findings from the interviews were the need to 
explore the conditions and premises of design in 
relation to the role of the human actors, and to 
explore and do more research related to how 
autonomous systems can handle the unexpected. 
Related to UAS, the interviews identified 
several key topics related to maintaining the 
safety of the future aviation system. Firstly, the 
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drone industry points out that there are two 
technological assumptions for future smart 
drones, namely the development of artificial 
intelligence integrated aboard the drone, as well 
as data protocol for communicating with the 
outside world. The drone industry does not 
perceive that technology per se will be a major 
obstacle to future developments.  
However, challenges regarding future 
regulation are pointed out - it is important that in 
the next few years a common European 
legislation is put in place that provides more 
predictability related to the use of UAS. Given the 
possibilities for drone technology, there are 
regulatory challenges. Regulation is unable to 
keep up with technological developments, which 
makes it challenging to develop practices and thus 
predict what is coming. This is also due to poor 
sharing of information of technological progress. 
There is a need to establish competence 
requirements for drone pilots, which minimum 
requirements should be required? This is 
important in terms of safety because, apart from 
knowing that the drone is reliable, one should also 
be able to trust that the person operating the drone 
over people have enough competence. The drone 
industry sees a need to build a safety culture like 
traditional aviation, since they are newcomers and 
are conscious/ humble in relation to such a role. 
From the drone industry, it is emphasized that 
the traditional aviation industry must recognize 
that drone use involves many members who do 
not have a traditional, aeronautical background, 
but at the same time are part of the future of 
aviation. The question is how to work best 
together. It is a great deal to learn and we are just 
starting. 
4. Conclusions 
There are many challenges and opportunities 
when introducing UAS systems. Some of the 
benefits or opportunities are: 
• The possibility to transfer dangerous 
operations to drones, minimizing the 
possibilities of accidents or harm to people. 
(By moving risky operations to drones). 
• The possibility of saving lives in a crisis by 
getting better information or speeding up 
delivery of critical supplies (i.e. blood or 
medicines) 
• The possibility to utilize and explore best 
practices from the ultra-high safety record of 
manned aviation into the UAS area 
Challenges related to establishment of safe and 
secure UAS operations: 
• Research and exploration of the ethical and 
social aspects of the use of UAS – strengthen 
and building societal actor networks to work 
with the issues (i.e. responsible adaption, 
privacy issues…) 
• Research into Human Factors based design of 
UAS such as Human factors Guidelines for 
Ground Control centres focusing on 
conditions and premises of the human actors. 
• Increased focus on security and safety of 
UAS, especially of UAS to be used in an 
industrial setting focusing on major risks and 
improvement of MTBF 
• More research related to how autonomous 
systems can handle the unexpected and 
surprises – and reflections on how to include 
the human in the loop when almost all 
functions are automated, and the human must 
handle the unexpected 
• Systematic documentation and reporting of 
all drone incidents in order to establish 
systematic data from incidents (safety and 
security related) and be able to explore 
MTBF in a systematic manner 
• Regulation to support deployment of 
industrial UAS in urban areas, and to 
integrate UAS in controlled airspace  
• Certification scheme and quality assurance 
program of requirements for industrial UAS 
to mitigate safety and security issues 
• Building and supporting systematic 
collaboration between key actors such as 
regulators, developers, suppliers, users, user 
organisations (such as UAS Norway) to 
ensure rapid development of best practices  
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